despite the calm demeanour of Hilālī throughout the hour-long conversation, the fact is that the latter had taken a discussion which is normally the preserve of scholars and advanced students of Islamic law to the general public: he had broken the code of the old boys' club. What may appear as a simple act of disclosure, however, seems to have had behind it something far more profound. In reproducing a forgotten interpretative contingency vis-à-vis alcoholic beverages, the Shaykh had at one fell swoop thrown open the very question of what marks Muslimness apart from other identities, insofar as the prohibition of alcohol is perceived as the preeminent marker of what constitutes the category Muslim.
Courting controversy, as Shaykh Hilālī did on this occasion, often involves reductionism, over-simplification, and even distortions of truth, wilful, or otherwise.
A principal aim of this article is therefore to unpack more fully, by way of close textual analysis, the detailed contours of the Ḥanafī school's position on alcoholic beverages. And while an enquiry of this kind will no doubt interest scholars and general readers alike, the over-arching purpose of this article goes beyond the immediate concerns associated with what is fundamentally a juridicotheological question. Our enquiry into the Ḥanafī school's position on alcohol suggests the futility of any attempt to define Islam on the basis of an essential and exclusive matrix of rules; more specifically, in the context of this article, we seek to demonstrate that Islam is an ontological category for Muslims and that essentialising Islam on the basis of specific ontic manifestations such as the prohibition of alcohol would be to reduce Islam -such a reduction, in the words of Sayyid, cited in the epigraph, is unsustainable. This article can be seen, therefore, as an intervention grouped under the rubric of critical Muslim studies, the agenda for which is set out by Sayyid (2014: 16) in the following terms: "Critical Muslims Studies … refers to a field of investigations into matters associated with Muslims which are framed by three related epistemological stances. It is characterised by systematic enquiries that are post-positivist, postOrientalist and decolonial." Our approach is post-positivist insofar as we seek through a recovery of an alternative discursive perspective on alcohol prohibition to shift the focus of research into matters Islamicate from ontic to ontological enquiries. 4 Additionally, we take a post-Orientalist step by taking into account Ḥanafī legal discourses from the post-eighteenth-century Indian-Islamicate context, avoiding thereby an Arab-centrism which characterises much of the scholarship on Ḥanafī law to date. This shifting of the lens is both long overdue and may be justified on the basis of demographic weight and on the basis of the relocation of the powerbase of the Ḥanafī school from Baghdad to Delhi.
The article begins by setting out a range of texts in translation, categorising, and contextualising the Ḥanafī position on alcoholic beverages (Section "Alcoholic Beverages in Ḥanafī Jurisprudence"). We then examine the debate in Indian Ḥanafism, which reveals a convinced and robust legal doctrine which is nevertheless ambivalent about the suitability of alcohol for the believing community (Section "From Baghdad to Delhi: Ḥanafism Relocated"). In the final part of the article (Section "Defending Narrow Prohibition: What is at Stake?"), an explanation of the theological rationale for the persistent and enduring defence of non-khamr alcoholic beverages by Ḥanafī jurists is offered.
Alcoholic Beverages in Ḥanafī Jurisprudence
The almost totemic prohibition on alcohol drinking as "the normative Muslim position" is as embedded in the imaginary of Muslims as it is circulated among non-Muslims. Ibn Rushd's (2000: 571) opening discussion on khamr is the extent of what most will know about the relationship of Muslims to alcohol:
With respect to khamr, [Muslim jurists] are agreed about its prohibition in small or large quantities, I mean, that which is derived from grape juice [. . . .] They agreed that the amount which intoxicates is prohibited. The majority of the jurists of Ḥijāz, as well as the majority of the traditionists, maintained that small and large amounts of intoxicating liquor are prohibited.
By the expression "Ḥijāzīs," Ibn Rushd refers to the Shāfi'īs, Mālikīs, and Hanbalīs; it is worth mentioning that Shi c īs and Zaydīs also adopted this position. The supporting evidences used by these doctrinal schools are presented in detail by Haider (2013) and so need not be repeated here. But it is important to read beyond this, in subsequent lines, where Ibn Rushd reveals that "the Irāqīs" took a very different position with respect to intoxicating beverages that were not khamr, disrupting thereby any attempt to claim a homogenous Muslim position on alcohol. 5 Ibrāhīm al-Nakha c ī, Sufyān al-Thawrī, Ibn Abī Laylā, Shurayk, Ibn Shubrama, Abū Ḥanīfa, and the remaining jurists of Kufa, as well as the majority of the jurists of Baṣra, we are told, "maintained that what is prohibited in all the remaining beverages (that is, besides wine derived from grape juice) is intoxication itself and not the substance (of the beverages)" (Ibn Rushd 2000: 571) . 6 The only surviving jurisprudential school of these is that of Abū Ḥanīfa. It is to the doctrine of his school, then, that we now turn for insight into Irāqī-Kūfian jurisprudential thinking on alcoholic beverages. The examination of Ḥanafī jurisprudence is divided based on the specific resources which are used REORIENT www.plutojournals.com/reorient to frame discussions: the first part examines the Ḥanafī arguments anchored in scriptural texts (naṣṣ) and characterises what we term the age of paleo-Ḥanafī thought; the second examines arguments anchored in a hermeneutic of reconciliation (tawfiq al-āthār) and characterises what we term the formative period; and the third is anchored in a legalism that typifies a new age of bureaucratic governmentality that can be located specifically from the twelfth century onwards.
An argument from tradition (āthār) 7 One of the earliest advocacies set out in Islamic jurisprudential literature in support of the permissibility of alcoholic beverages is found in Kitāb al-āthār of the great Kufian jurist, Muḥammad b. Ḥasan al-Shaybānī (d. 189/806). In several sections, the first of which is entitled Bāb al-ashriba wa l-anbidha wa l-shurb qā'iman wa mā yukrahu fi l-sharāb -Chapter on Alcoholic Beverages and Wines and Drinking Standing and Rebukable [Mannerisms] Concerning Drinking, al-Shaybānī transmits fifteen ḥadīths that are, in all probability, a polemical challenge to contemporary jurists peddling the doctrine of absolute prohibition. Most of the statements are reported through chains that commence with Abū Ḥanīfa (d. 150/767) -al-Shaybānī's esteemed teacher -and are concluded in virtually every case with, "... this is our view, and it is the doctrine (qawl) of Abū Ḥanīfa." The first of the fifteen is also perhaps the one which would have startled prohibitionists the most: reported by Abū Ḥanīfa, the tradition is of a Sulaymān al-Shaybānī, who reports that Ibn Ziyād (governor of Kufa during the reigns of Mu c awiya I and Yazīd I, d. 67/686) once informed him about an occasion when he was at the home of Ibn c Umar, the son of the famously austere Companion of the Prophet c Umar b. al-Khaṭṭāb. The two had been fasting, and the time for breaking the fast had come upon them. Incredibly, Ibn c Umar offered Ibn Ziyād an alcoholic drink to break his fast with, which his guest duly accepted. Ibn Ziyād, we are told, became significantly inebriated (akhadha fīhi). The following morning, having almost not made it back to his home the night before because of the strength of the brew, Ibn Ziyād returned to Ibn c Umar to enquire as to the nature of the drink served to him the night before. Ibn c Umar explained that he had given his guest no more than dates and raisins (mā zidnāka c ala c ajwa wa zabīb; Al-Shaybānī 2008: 699-700) . This ḥadīth serves two purposes for al-Shaybānī: first, to underscore the doctrine of general permissibility and second, to challenge the by now widely held view that dates and raisins were not to be mixed.
The role of Ibn c Umar in this tradition is remarkable since many of the ḥadīths which mandate general prohibition are reported by him, especially those collected by al-Bukhārī in the Jāmi c al-s� aḥīḥ. 8 Furthermore, Ibn c Umar is one of the most important sources of law for the Medinese school, which in the ninth century, constituted the main opposing faction, along with al-Shāfi c ī (d. 820), of Abū Ḥanīfa and his madrasa. Furthermore, the isnād Mālik<Nāfi c <Ibn c Umar, as highlighted by Schacht (1967: 176) , was particularly revered, especially by al-Shāfi c ī. It is even more remarkable, therefore, that the second tradition in this section of Kitāb al-āthār has the isnād Abū Ḥanīfa <Nāfi c <Ibn c Umar.
In the following section of Āthār, titled Chapter on Strong Beer (al-nabīdh al-shadīd), 9 which seems to be a response to opponents who are arguing that the beverages drunk by the Prophet and his Companions were never alcoholic, there is a very interesting statement reported on the authority of Abū Ḥanīfa, from his master, Ḥammād. It is in fact an anecdote told by Ḥammād, who explains how he reneged from his initial position of abstention after visiting the home of the venerated jurist of Kufa, Ibrāhīm al-Nakha c ī (d. ca. 96/717). Ḥammād had visited Ibrāhīm to partake in a meal; Ibrāhīm served him more than he had bargained for, requesting from either his wife or his servant a goblet of alcohol (nabīdh), which he duly set before his guest. It being after the meal, this was probably presented to Ḥammād as a digestif. Whatever the occasion, Ḥammād politely refused the drink. Ibrāhīm was not well-pleased and so, in order to assuage Ḥammād, narrated a tradition on the authority of c Alqama, who reported that c Abdullāh b. Mas c ūd would drink alcohol (nabīdh) after meals. With no doubt in his mind about the stature of Ibn Mas c ūd, Ḥammād relented and shared in the drink with his host (Al-Shaybānī 2008:703) .
That early Muslims were using alcohol as a digestif is also attested by a subsequent ḥadīth in Kitāb al-āthār reported on the authority of Abū Ḥanīfa via Abū Isḥāq al-Sabī c ī and c Amr b. Maymūn al-Awadī to c Umar b. al-Khaṭṭāb: "The Muslims have a camel for food, the neck of which belongs to the House of c Umar! And the meat of this camel is not digested in our stomachs except with the help of strong alcohol (al-nabīdh al-shadīd)" (ibid.: 705). Al-Shaybānī lends his support, adding that it was a tradition which informed Abū Ḥanīfa's jurisprudence.
A hermeneutic of reconciliation
Abū Ja c far al-Ṭaḥāwī (d. 321/933) is not only one of Islam's foremost legal minds, he is also the author of the most widely accepted articulation of Sunni orthodoxy, known as al-c Aqīdat al-Ṭaḥāwiyya. In the preamble to his Sharḥ Ma c ānī al-Āthar, Al-Ṭaḥāwī (2001: 1.7) states that his principal motivation for writing what posthumously proved to be the most sophisticated and thorough apology for Ḥanafī jurisprudential thought was to salvage the Prophetic Sunna:
A knowledgeable companion of mine has requested that I record in writing those received traditions (āthār ma'thūra) of the Messenger of God which relate to legal judgments (aḥkām) that the people of deviance and weak-mind (ahl al-ilḥād wa l-ḍa c fa) have erroneously taken to be contradictory because of: 1) their lack of knowledge regarding the abrogating (nāsikh) and the abrogated (mansūkh); and 2) their lack of knowledge concerning what must be put into practice from these [traditions] , as testified by the Clear Book (al-Kitāb al-nāṭiq) and the agreed-upon Sunna.
In essence, Al-Ṭaḥāwī means to say that the failure to develop a proper hermeneutic to accommodate conflicting or contradictory āthār has led to the rejection of some -and perhaps even many -soundly transmitted traditions. Specific individuals and groups are not identified, but it is obvious that he means by this many early and contemporaneous masters -al-Bukhārī and other Ṣiḥāḥ authors included. 10 The statement is obviously very bold, and Al-Ṭaḥāwī is not always successful at doing what he sets out to. Notwithstanding this, it is clear from the Sharḥ that he is an ardent Ḥanafī who will mobilise all of his artillery in defence of his school's doctrines and praxis.
The chapter on alcoholic beverages in the Sharḥ must have been a devastating blow for the agenda of the traditionists and all jurists of non-Hanafi persuasion, who were invariably prohibitionist on the question of alcohol, especially the Shāfi c īs; indeed, for them, the blow must have been redoubled, for the Sharḥ presents a sophisticated critique of the legal doctrine on alcohol by an ex-Shāfi c ī. And although not yet canonised, al-Bukhārī's Jāmic al-ṣaḥīḥ and Muslim's al-Musnad al-ṣaḥīḥ would both have been directly challenged by the Sharḥ since it highlights the partiality of both for their failure to report the full range of soundly transmitted traditions relating to alcoholic beverages.
The section in Al-Ṭaḥāwī's Sharḥ on alcoholic beverages has three primary aims: (1) to set out the full range of traditions on alcoholic beverages, (2) to isolate (uncooked) grape wine as the only prohibited alcoholic beverage, and (3) to demonstrate the robustness of the Ḥanafī position, specifically the position of Abū Ḥanīfa, on alcohol. The task required of Al-Ṭaḥāwī the crafting of a hermeneutic framework seldom encountered in early jurisprudential literature.
Al-Ṭaḥāwī begins by asking the question, what is the prohibited khamr? The response of almost all non-Ḥanafī jurists to this question was by now clearly formulated: anything that has the capacity to inebriate is khamr, whatever its source may be. Indeed, to non-Ḥanafīs, the very question would have seemed absurd. Their position, however, was secure only for as long as the proverbial elephant in the room was ignored: in this case, a corpus of traditions that clearly granted permission to Muslims to consume a wide range of alcoholic, potentially inebriating, beverages made of non-grape sources. The first is the tradition of c Īsa, who reports that his father sent him to Anas b. Mālik for a need; c Īsa saw that Anas had with him a strong ṭilā. Al-Ṭaḥāwī glosses this: ṭilā is a beverage which inebriates in large amounts -yet despite this, Anas did not consider it to be khamr (Al-Ṭaḥāwī 2001: 4.6). According to Al-Ṭaḥāwī, "It is therefore clear from what we have described that khamr, according to Anas, was not from every intoxicating beverage; it was rather only from certain beverages" (ibid.: 4.6 Al-Ṭaḥāwī sets out a signally conflicting position on alcohol to the position of the prohibitionists. He goes further than this: rather than reject outright the traditions which seemingly challenge his doctrine on alcohol, he takes as given their validity since they at the very least represent the views of the opposing camp, for which he demonstrates utmost respect; he therefore proceeds with a careful dissection of them, seeking wherever possible to harmonise between them and traditions permitting alcohol. The traditions he selects for analysis were widely cited by prohibitionists -they are traditions which would be familiar to many Muslims today as they are quoted ad nauseum by contemporary supporters of absolute prohibition.
The first of them is the report of Abū Hurayra, transmitted with multiple chains, according to which the Prophet said: "Khamr is from these two trees alone: the vine and the date-palm." 11 The tradition broadens the scope of khamr to include date wine as well as grape wine. Al-Ṭaḥāwī suggests three ways this tradition can be harmonised with the view of the Ḥanafis -that only wine from grapes is khamr. The first hermeneutic possibility is that the statement of the Prophet does not encompass both trees but only one of them: in this case, the sole referent of the prohibition is the vine. The Qur'an (8: 130) is cited in support: "O Jinn and Men, did not come from you all messengers?" Al-Ṭaḥāwī points out that "the messengers are from men [only] and not jinn." A tradition of c Ubāda b. al-Ṣāmit is also cited, in which the Prophet explained to the companions who had pledged the oath of allegiance at c Aqaba that corporal punishment is an expiation for anyone who commits the crimes of associationism, theft, or adultery; Al-Ṭaḥāwī again suggests that this statement is qualified: "We all know that someone who commits associationism (shirk) is never forgiven, even if he is punished." It is through an inter-textual approach that Al-Ṭaḥāwī is able to exclude non-grape alcohols from a general pronouncement.
The second hermeneutic possibility is that the Prophet did in fact mean both trees together but only that which is fermented from them both is to be counted as khamr. This, according to Al-Ṭaḥāwī, is the view of Abū Ḥanīfa, Abū Yūsuf, and Muḥammad al-Shaybānī as it relates to fermented raisins and dates. The last hermeneutic possibility suggested by our jurist is also the one he clearly favours, since it links nicely with the tradition of Ibn c Abbās above: what is meant by the "khamr of grapes" is the very juice itself, after it has been through the process of fermentation; as for the "khamr of dates," it is the point at which date juice begins to cause inebriation (Al-Ṭaḥāwī 2001: 4.4). In this way, Al-Ṭaḥāwī (2001: 4.5) is able to neutralise the efficacy of this tradition, thus preserving the status of narrow prohibition to grapes alone; and these three hermeneutic possibilities are equally applicable to what is known as the hadith of c Umar, which is narrated by his son, c Abdullāh: Therefore we are witnesses by God that grape juice, once fermented, is prohibited; we will not be witnesses by Him, however, that other beverages besides, when fermented, are also prohibited. This is because, in the case of khamr, we are sure of its prohibition in the Qur'an. However, we cannot say the same of other beverages. Therefore khamr is prohibited in large and small quantities, whereas other kinds of drink are only prohibited when they [begin to cause] inebriation -in all other cases they are permitted. This is our view, and it is the position of Abū Ḥanīfa, Abū Yūsuf and Muḥammad (al-Shaybānī), may God have mercy on them all. The only exception to all of this is the case of fermented The statement is poignant because it illustrates that there is more Al-Ṭaḥāwī wants to prove than simply a legal argument: he is, above and beyond mere legalism, seeking to salvage what he believes to be a marker of Sunnī Islam. 12 In the subsequent section, Al-Ṭaḥāwī asks, what amount of nabīdh is prohibited? By asking this question, al-Tāḥāwī is taking a stand against jurists who peddle the view that all alcoholic beverages are to be categorised as khamr because of their potentially inebriating power. In this discussion, he demarcates all non-grape-based alcohols as a separate category from grape-based alcohols, terming the former as nabīdh. In support of this taxonomy, he cites two traditions in particular which form the foundation of the argument supporting general prohibition: the first is the ḥadīth of Ibn c Umar: "Every intoxicant is khamr, and every khamr is prohibited" and the second, the ḥadīth of c Āmir b. Sa c d: "I forbid you [even] a small amount of that which inebriates in large quantities." There are tens of traditions listed by Al-Ṭaḥāwī of the same vein. Astonishingly, our jurist concludes that the traditions, despite their number and clarity, are not conclusive since they could imply, as understood by the advocates of general prohibition, that all alcohol is forbidden, but they could also imply that alcohol is prohibited only at the point at which it causes intoxication. There is a need, argues Al-Ṭaḥāwī, for supporting evidence which might resolve the ambiguityevidence which he will furnish in abundance.
Ḥammām b. al-Ḥārith is quoted as saying that c Umar b. al-Khaṭṭāb was once on a journey when he was brought some nabīdh. After drinking some of it, he was seen to grimace because of its strength. He called for water, which he used to dilute the beverage before returning to drink (ibid.: 4.12). In another tradition, c Umar is said to have requested nabīdh after he was stabbed several times by his assailants; he used the alcoholic nabīdh for its anaesthetising property, which provided relief from the pain of his stab wounds. He of course died from these shortly afterwards (ibid.: 4.12). In another tradition, c Umar again is quoted, this time as saying: "We drink from this nabīdh a drink which breaks down the meat in our stomachs so that it does not harm us." The narrator, c Amr b. Maymūn then adds that he drank from c Umar's nabīdh and found it to be one of the strongest he had imbibed (ibid.: 4.12). In a particularly revealing tradition, a drunk man is brought to c Umar for a flogging. c Umar duly metes out the punishment, after which the man complains that he had only drunk from c Umar's drink. c Umar replied rather disinterestedly, "So what?" suggesting that this was no excuse for the man's drunkenness.
That Al-Ṭaḥāwī adduces traditions of c Umar throughout his discussion on alcohol warrants a comment. It is interesting that c Umar is generally not as frequently cited in support of Ḥanafī doctrines as are c Ali and Ibn Mas c ūd (Schacht 1967: 31) . These two are described by Schacht as the most important authorities of the Iraqians. So why should c Umar be cited with greater frequency than usual in chapters of Ḥanafī law? It is probably by virtue of the fact that c Umar was held by the Mālikīs and Shāfi c ī's as the most important legal authority after the Prophet. Schacht (1967: 25) 
notes,
The role of c Umar as a main authority of the Medinese is explicitly stated in many passages in Tr. III, for instance in S. 87: "You reply: If something is related from c Umar, one does not ask why and how, and one does not counter it by interpreting the Koran differently."
There could not therefore have been an authority more useful for Al-Ṭaḥāwī's defence than c Umar, at least in his debate with fellow Sunnī jurists. Al-Ṭaḥāwī (2001: 4.11) provides his own explanation:
We find c Umar b. al-Khaṭṭāb among those who have reported on the authority of the Messenger of God that he said, "Every intoxicant is prohibited." Yet there has also been reported from him the opinion that small amounts of strong nabīdh is permissible.
After adducing the many traditions of c Umar, numbering no less than nine, Al-Ṭaḥāwī (2001: 4.13) concludes by saying, Since we have established on the basis of mentions on the authority of c Umar that a small amount of strong nabīdh is permitted -the same c Umar who heard the Prophet say, "Every intoxicant is prohibited" -his behavior must surely be an indication that the Prophet meant only to prohibit that part of strong nabīdh which causes intoxication.
After this, Ibn c Umar, the other great authority for the Mālikīs and Shāfi c ī's, is cited for traditions also permitting the drinking of nabīdh up till the point of intoxication. These reinforce the position of course but also provide variations of the traditions of c Umar, making it more difficult to ignore. Most are too similar to be worth re-presenting, though the last, a tradition on the authority of Abū Mūsā al-Āsh c arī, which Ibn Rushd also cites in his legal compendium, Bidāyat al-mujtahid, deserves mentioning as a foundational proof of the Kufians. Abū Mūsā is reported to have said,
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The Messenger of God sent me and Mu c ādh to Yemen. We said, "O Messenger of God, there are two drinks there they make from wheat and barley. One of them is called mizr (made from maize), the other is called bitac (made from honey); which one should we drink?" He replied, "Drink them both but do not get drunk." (cited in Siddiqui 2012: 96) This tradition is a variation of a better-known tradition collected by al-Bukhārī. In his Jāmi c al-ṣaḥīḥ, the same Abū Mūsā says,
The Prophet sent me and Mu c ādh to Yemen. We said, "O Prophet of God, in that land there is a drink from wheat called mizr and a drink from honey called bita c ." The Prophet said, "Every intoxicating [drink] is prohibited." 13 How are these conflicting traditions to be received? Both are supposed to have been conversations between the Prophet and Abū Mūsā. Today, Muslims would have no difficulty in deciding which of them represents the Sunna; in the age of al-Ṭaḥāwī, however, the Jāmi c al-ṣaḥīḥ had not yet attained canonical status, which meant even the version reported by al-Ṭaḥāwī could serve as the foundation of religious praxis.
Legalistic appraisals
According to Meron (1969:6) , the Tuḥfat al-fuqahā of c Alā' al-dīn al-Samarqandī (d. 539/1144) marks the emergence of a methodical approach in Ḥanafī law which attains a new degree of refinement, with every "Book" and every chapter starting with an enumeration of topics, followed by an orderly discussion of them. We might also consider this as marking a shift to a paradigm of codification of jurisprudential thought, in which legal proofs give way to a quest for typology.
Al-Samarqandī's discussion of alcoholic beverages begins with a list of drinks and their descriptions (Al-Samarqandī 1995: 3.325-3.326) . He then provides the legal judgement (ḥukm) for each one. Khamr is of course prohibited (ḥarām) both in small and large quantities (qalīluhā wa kathīruhā); it is impermissible to derive any utility from it, not even for its medicinal qualities; the one who denies this is to be excommunicated because its prohibition is "clearly established by a categorical text of the Qur'an (thabatat bi-naṣṣ al-Qur'ān)"; owning or trading it is prohibited; a ḥadd punishment of eighty lashes is the requital for one who drinks even a small amount of it (Al-Samarqandī 1995: 3.327).
The legal ruling, says Al-Samarqandī, for sakar, naqī c , fad� īkh, and bādhiq is one and the same: they are ḥarām to drink in both small and large quantities, however, their prohibited status is lower than the status of khamr -therefore, one who denies their prohibited status is not to be excommunicated while one who drinks them in amounts that do not intoxicate is not subjected to a ḥadd punishment. Al-Samarqandī points out that there is no unanimity concerning the legal status of these beverages: he cites Bishr al-Mursī (d. 228/842), a student of Abū Ḥanīfa, as someone who considered all to be permissible based on ḥadīth traditions he possessed. As for selling or owning these drinks, Abū Ḥanīfa considered it permissible, whereas Abū Yūsūf and Muḥammad al-Shaybānī considered it ḥaram. Al-Samarqandī prefers Abū Ḥanīfa's opinion, which he rationalises thus: the traditions regarding these drinks are conflicting with regard to their permissibility; we only say that they are ḥarām by way of caution. This should not take away the right of people to trade in them.
The legal ruling for t� ilā', nabīdh 1 , and nabīdh 2 is one and the same: they are permissible in small quantities; only at the point of intoxication do they become ḥarām, and if someone gets inebriated, he is subjected to the ḥadd punishment. We are told that this is the view of Abū Ḥanīfa and Abū Yūsuf; from Muḥammad al-Shaybānī, two opinions are reported: one is the view that these are prohibited and the ḥadd is imposed when someone gets inebriated. A second opinion is presented in al-Shaybānī's own words: "I do not prohibit [these] but neither do I drink [them] ." Al-Samarqandī says unequivocally that the correct position is that of Abū Ḥanīfa and Abū Yūsuf for their conformity with the majority of Companions who also held that to drink these beverages is permissible. He further says that Abū Ḥanīfa held that to believe these drinks are permissible is a mark ( c alāma) of the People of the Sunna and the Jamā c a, that is, Sunnī orthodoxy. Concluding his discussion, Al-Samarqandī says that alcohol made from wheat, barley, maize, honey, fig, and the like are all permissible. Astonishingly, he says that there is no ḥadd punishment for drinking these, even if someone gets drunk (Al-Samarqandī 1995: 3.326-3.328) .
Given that Badā'i c al-ṣanā'i c of c Alā' al-Dīn Abū Bakr b. Mas c ūd al-Kāsānī (Meron 1969: 82) is based heavily on Al-Samarqandī's Tuḥfa, it is worth a brief comment here. The chapter on alcoholic beverages is revealing. The same drinks classified in the Tuḥfa as ḥarām are classified as such here: khamr, sakar, fad� īkh, and naqī c ; the same qualification is stated: no ḥadd is imposed on the one who drinks the latter three, unless they become inebriated. T� ilā', bādhiq, munaṣṣaf, and muthallath are all permissible up until the last intoxicating cup; jumhūrī, mizr and bita c may be drunk without any fear of corporal chastisement, even if one were to drink beyond the point of inebriation (Kāsānī 2003: 6.473-6.474 ). Abū Ḥanīfa is quoted as saying that nabīdh is never to be prohibited:
ReOrient 3.2 Produced and distributed by Pluto Journals Abū Ḥanīfa deemed the permissibility of muthallath to be from the markers of the Doctrine of the Sunna and the Community (Madhhab al-Sunna wa l-Jamā c a). He said by way of clarification: "It (i.e. the doctrine) is to prefer the two shaykhs (Abū Bakr and c Umar), to consider an obligation the circumcision, to deem valid the wiping over the leather socks and not prohibiting nabīdh wine because to do so would be to castigate the foremost Companions (may god be pleased with them); withholding from declaring them sinners, and refraining from criticizing them, are from the markers of the Sunna and the Community." (ibid.)
Ḥanafī law in the context of bureaucratic governmentality
A number of scholars have previously noted a so-called shift in Ḥanafī legal thinking on alcohol, which, it is claimed, took place around the twelfth century. Najam Haider (2013) is one such scholar. He points to the jurisprudential work of Burhān al-Dīn al-Marghinānī (d. 593/1196) as the turning point. According to Haider, the shift was prompted partly by increasing pressure exerted on the Ḥanafīs by the Mālikīs and Shāfi c ī's. This claim, however, is not borne out in the literature as will be demonstrated below.
Burhān al-Dīn al-Marghinānī (d. 593/1196), al-Hidāya
Al-Marghinānī's commentary on the Bidāyat al-mubtadī marks a shift in Ḥanafī jurisprudential thinking on alcohol: for the first time, it would seem, the position ascribed to al-Shaybānī favouring general prohibition is presented on a par with the Ḥanafī position of narrow prohibition. Many of the traditional Ḥanafī arguments in support of narrow prohibition are still presented in the Hidāya, and the Shāfi c ī school, in particular, is the target of a polemic which is at times stinging. It is noteworthy that al-Shaybānī's view in support of general prohibition is but a line and is virtually unsupported by the popular Traditionist arguments in support of general prohibition. What can be inferred, therefore, is that al-Marghinānī is merely making the prohibition of alcohol an option, probably for authorities (although he does not describe it as a fatwa) and certainly for non-State authorities who may be seeking legitimacy for an outright ban of alcohol -teachers, parents, community leaders, and so on.
Al-Marghinānī's classification of beverages is typical: khamr is by definition the intoxicating drink made of uncooked grapes and dates; it is unconditionally prohibited, and the one found drinking it in large or small quantities is subjected to corporal punishment. T� ilā/bādhiq, munaṣṣaf, sakar, and naqī c are all prohibited but their status is short of ḥarām -they are classified as ḥarām makrūh, which implies that the scriptural basis for deeming them as prohibited was not sufficiently robust as to warrant or justify an outright declaration of prohibition. The implications of this are that one who is found drinking these beverages cannot be punished unless he has exceeded the legal threshold that would render him sakrān (drunk). All other drinks are fine (lā ba'sa bi-hā -"there is nothing wrong with them"), and they include alcohols made from wheat, barley, maize, and honey. Al-Marghinānī (1999: 2.399) ascribes to Abū Ḥanīfa the view that the category of drinks lā ba'sa bi-hā are ḥalāl even beyond the legal threshold -in theory, one could get drunk imbibing them without there being any legal implications. Al-Marghinānī ascribes to al-Shaybānī the view that all are ḥarām and if drunk warrant a punishment of eighty lashes if the legal threshold has been exceeded.
Fakhr al-Dīn al-H� asan b. Mans� ūr Qād� īkhān (d. 593/1196), Fatāwā Qād� īkhān
Qāḍīkhān, contemporary of al-Marghinānī from Transoxania, maintains quite expectedly that khamr is ḥarām (Qāḍīkhān 2009: 3.81-90) . All other drinks, however, are treated with varying degrees of tolerance: even when they are prohibited, exceptional production methods can make them ḥalāl. Bādhiq is one such drink, which, according to Qāḍīkhān, becomes ḥarām when fully fermented, with a punishment associated with it whenever it is drunk beyond the legal threshold. However, if it maintains its sweet flavour, it is ḥalāl (ibid.). Munaṣṣaf is fine as well, unless it reaches full fermentation; Muthallath is unconditionally ḥalāl, although there is a punishment for drinking it to excess, as are jumhūrī and ḥumaydī/bukhtuj (ibid.). From the sources which are non-grape and date, permissibility is once again the default -alcohols from pear and apple are listed, as are the beverages from the ḥubūb (wheat, barley, and maize). There are no repercussions, according to Qāḍīkhān, for drinking any of these, even if they are imbibed to excess (i.e. beyond the point of intoxication; ibid.).
Al-Shaykh Niz� ām, al-Fatāwā l-Hindiyya/al-Fatāwā al-c Ālamgīriyya
A compendium of Ḥanafī legal opinions commissioned by Mughal Sultan Awrangzīb c Ālamgīr (r. 1068-1118/158-1707), this work was compiled under the supervision of Shaykh Niẓām of Burḥanpūr (d. 1089/1678) who oversaw a group of over 40 Ḥanafī experts, each of whom contributed to what was a relatively unique project in its time. Despite its title, the text does not fit the usual form of the fatwa genre: the opinions collected in it are not those of muftis but rather legal opinions culled from earlier collections of Ḥanafī law, especially the Hidāya. It is no surprise, therefore, that the verdict on alcoholic beverages is a virtual replica of ReOrient 3.2 Produced and distributed by Pluto Journals al-Marghinānī's discussion. The distinguishing feature, however, is a statement at the end of the survey of alcoholic beverages, a fatwa no less, issued in support of general prohibition:
As for those [alcoholic beverages] which are considered ḥalāl according to the majority of scholars, they are ṭilā (which is muthallath) and the nabīdh of dates and raisins. These are permissible to drink up until the point of intoxication for the purposes of digesting food, medication and to energise oneself for the worship of God; they are not [permissible] for wanton diversion. They become ḥarām at the point at which they cause inebriation. This is the statement of most [jurists] . If someone gets drunk, then the ḥadd is applied to him; it is permissible to sell these [drinks] and to insure them against loss according to Abū Ḥanīfa and Abū Yūsuf; this is also the soundest opinion that has been reported from Muḥammad [al-Shaybānī] . And in a report from him, small and large amounts of these are ḥarām, though no ḥadd is applied as long as there is no intoxication. This is what is found in the Muḥīṭ of al-Sarakhsī. The fatwa in our times is in accordance with [this view] of Muḥammad, such that a person who becomes inebriated from alcoholic drinks made of grains, honey, milk and figs is to be punished; this is because the sinning folk (fussāq) congregate for these drinks in our time, with the intention of getting drunk and for wanton diversion. (Niẓām 2000: 5.497) Unlike Al-Samarqandī, who highlights the problem of the veracity of this statement from al-Shaybānī, Niẓām, beyond presenting it as the basis for this fatwa, has nothing to say about its historicity.
Muḥammad Amīn Ibn c Abidīn (d. 1252/1836), Radd al-muḥtār
Ibn c Abidīn was the Ottoman dynasty's last great Shaykh al-Islam. His discussion on alcoholic beverages, as set out in his commentary on the Durr al-mukhtār, reinforces the position of many Ottoman grand muftis before him:
It is according to the position of Muḥammad (al-Shaybānī) that the fatwa is given. This is also the doctrine of the three imāms (Mālik, Shafi c ī and Aḥmad), based on his statement, upon him be peace, "Every intoxicant is khamr, and every intoxicant is ḥarām." This is reported by Muslim. Also, he said, upon him be peace, "Whatever intoxicates in large amounts is forbidden in small amounts." This is reported by Aḥmad, Ibn Mājah and al-Dāraquṭnī. This opinion has been deemed the soundest by the authors of al- Multaqā al-Mawāhib, al-Kāfiya wa l-Nāhiya, al-Mi c Interestingly, we are also provided with a definition of drunkenness, or the point at which someone might be deemed drunk (sakrān). Echoing the opinion of centuries of Ḥanafī tradition, Ibn c Ābidīn (2003: 6.74) tells us, "He is drunk (al-sakrān) who cannot distinguish a man from a woman (lā yufarriq bayna al-rajul wa l-mar'a), or the sky from earth (wa l-samā' wa l-ard� ); it is said also that his speech becomes senseless jabber (yakhtalit� kalāmuhu)." The conditions under which one can legitimately drink alcohol, up until intoxication, are also set out by Ibn c Ābidīn (2003: 10.35 ): alcoholic beverages may only be considered ḥalāl when used (1) to aid digestion (istimrā' al-t� a c ām), (2) for medicinal purposes (tadāwin), and (3) to give one the strength for the worship of God (al-taqawwī c alā t� ā c at Allāh). Glossing this last point, he says, "Such beverages might energise a person to stand longer in prayer or aid fasting; they also aid in fighting the enemies of God (li qitāl a c dā Allāh)." It is unanimously agreed, Ibn c Ābidīn adds, that drinking which results in distraction from one's duties (al-lahw) is ḥarām.
Thus completes our exploration of Arabophone Ḥanafism. We now shift the focal point of this article to India, the second powerbase of the school.
From Baghdad to Delhi: Ḥanafism Relocated
The significance of Indian (including Afghania and Bengal) Ḥanafism in the debates surrounding the ongoing contestations of orthodoxy within Sunni Islam cannot be downplayed due to three factors: first, because the living isnāds of the canonical Ḥadīth go through Barelwi and Deobandi Sufi networks which originate in Baghdad (and Kufa); second, Delhi becomes the centre of Islamicate knowledge production in Farsi and Urdu from the eighteenth century onwards, in addition to Arabic, largely through scholarly output and demographic weight; and third, the pronounced Ḥanafī identity which is idiosyncratic to non-Arab lands is palpable in jurisprudential polemics in India. The Ḥanafīs were pitted against the Ahl-i-Ḥadīth movement and its prominent ideologue Siddiq Hasan Khan (d. 1307 Khan (d. /1890 , who deemed themselves the defenders of the canonical texts. Amid the usual minutia of devotional acts and dogmata, the argument over the legal status of nabīdh was once again reignited. Additionally, Indian Ḥanafism has an interesting internal schism of its own. Since the great reformer Shāh Waliullāh (d. 1176/1762), All too often "maybe the ḥadīth didn't reach him" (la c all al-ḥadīth lam yablughu) is a patronising cliché found in jurisprudential polemics against Abū Ḥanīfa and Mālik and is cynically reproduced here. Notwithstanding odd Ḥanafi capitulations, this being the best example of such, the dominant players in the polemics such as Aḥmad Riza Khan (d. 1340 Khan (d. /1921 . By way of illustration, the choice of subsection titles very much indicates his overall thesis. In this ḥadīth collection he begins the book on beverages with the "chapter on the impermissibility of wine" (bāb ḥurmat al-khamr). After adducing evidence from ḥadīth (Aḥmad, Muslim and al-Nasā'ī), c Uthmānī declares that this hadith is an explicit statute (naṣṣ) on the impermissibility of the consumption of wine (khamr) and the sale of it. Its impermissibility and it being impure is expressly stated in the Qur'an. To this extent the Muslim community are in agreement, however, there are types of beverages the vinous nature of which is debatable (illā annā fī khumriyyatihā shubha) (Al-c Uthmānī 1997: 25-6).
Al-Dārquṭnī's (d. 385/995) narration from the Prophet which reads "that which intoxicates a lot, a little of it too is prohibited (mā askara kathīruhu fa qalīluhu ḥarām)" is all too often used by the other schools and the Ahl-i-Ḥadīth in the contemporary era. In response to this, 'Uthmānī (1997: 28) argues, . . . we say, we do not reject this ḥadīth, rather it is not explicit statute as you allege, because it is probable that what is implied is that it is prohibited in and of itself (ḥarām li'aynihi) rather than intoxication (dūn sakrihi), like wine (khamr). Therefore it would mean wine is prohibited in large and small quantities. This interpretation is our express position (wa hadhā al-ta'wīl huwa al-muta'ayyun c indanā).
After making a lengthy defence of Abū Ḥanīfa's position, c Uthmānī (1997) concludes, . . . with this account the sum of the ambiguities regarding Abu Ḥanīfa's position are dispelled, however our elders have ruled on the statement of [Imam] Muḥammad on the issue of intoxicating beverages due to it being closer to the manifest wording of the statutes and piety and far from distraction (talahhī).
What is telling here is a general motif in Deobandi exoteric Sufism, best exemplified in the missionary activities of the Tablighi Jamaat. Whenever spiritual advice or even fatwas are issued on Shar c īa-silent mubāḥ issues, there is a propensity to put forward non-committal platitudes such as "it is best to avoid it." c Uthmānī (1997: 32-3) continues to comment on two ḥadīths regarding honey mead, beer from wheat and barley:
. . . the two ḥadīths indicate that honey mead, maize, and barley were not known to the Companions as "wines," otherwise they need not have asked the Prophet after already knowing the prohibition of khamr, like they didn't need to ask concerning khamr of grapes and dates. This is evidence that these beverages are not khamr in the literal sense, rather they have been applied as simile (wajh al-tashbih) since they share some qualities with it, especially clouding of the intellect and prohibition of intoxication. Therefore there is no proof from these ḥadīth for he who claims that honey mead and other beers are literally wine.
c Uthmānī (1997: 33) goes on to argue that the Prophet's calling these beverages khamr was for analogous purposes not for legislation. He brazenly boasts, "You have nothing to stand on (falā ḥujja lakum fīhi)." c Uthmānī (1997: 36) explains the hadith "kull muskirin ḥarām wa kull muskirin khamr":
. . . every intoxicant is prohibited whether it is actual (ḥaqīqatan) or virtual (ḥukman). Actual khamr is prohibited in large or small quantities. Virtual khamr on the other hand is prohibited up to the point of intoxication. Therefore what is meant by the Prophet's words "all intoxicants," is that all intoxicants, khamr and otherwise, are ḥarām; as for khamr, it is so in large or small quantities; as for other beverages, it is the intoxicating amount thereof.
Since the permissibility of drinking a small amount of strong nabīdh has been established from what we have mentioned regarding c Umar, and him hearing the Messenger of God saying "every intoxicant is prohibited," him drinking this type of nabīdh is evidence that what the Messenger of God forbade was the intoxication from it only. It is probable that he heard this as a statement from the Prophet or a position of his own. His position is proof for us, especially if his aforementioned action in the reports indicate it was done in the presence of the Companions of the Messenger of God and none repudiated it. This too indicates they followed him in this.
c Uthmānī (1997: 41) goes on to say "many dear scholars (aḥbāb) do not refer to the books of the folk in this regard and disparage them without knowledge."
In sum, c Uthmānī's whole discussion is very much like the style of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210), who was notorious for "adducing dubious arguments in cash and accruing doubt by interest" (yūridu al-shubaha naqdan, wa yurbīhi nasī'atan) , that is to say he deliberately lost arguments and planted the seeds of doubt on a particular issue by faithfully reproducing "heterodox" views and rebutting them with simply a sentence to say the aforementioned is wrong and that "God knows best" (see, for example, Al-Rāzī 2000: 140) . c Uthmānī deconstructs all arguments except the projection back to Imam Muḥammad and his supposed position. It seems like "God knows best" is a way of hedging all bets. Even Imam Ahmed Riza Khan (1991) , the arch-nemesis of the Deoband Seminary, theoretically bolsters the position of his counterparts in his defending the position of Abū Ḥanīfa as being the normative fatwa of the school.
Defending Narrow Prohibition: What is at Stake?
It is clear that the Ḥanafīs expended a great deal of effort to defend their position on narrow prohibition, even in those texts which gave precedence to the position of al-Shaybanī. In fact, they were, and remain, the only school to dedicate a chapter (kitāb) in their jurisprudential works to the subject of alcoholic beverages -Kitāb al-ashriba, which is thus a hallmark of Hanafi jurisprudence. Other schoolsShāfi c ī, Mālikī, and Ḥanbalī -would at most only discuss alcohol within the subject matter of corporal punishment, ḥudūd; this makes sense given that their position was one of general prohibition. This section examines the reasons underlying the Ḥanafī investment in the subject of alcoholic beverages; it explores why the school never relinquished the position, or madhhab, of its founder, Abū Ḥanīfa, even in the face of vitriolic criticism of their opponents and often scathing ad hominem arguments directed their way.
The theological justifications given by the Ḥanafīs in support of their view on alcohol are available in legal texts and doctrinal tracts. That the discussion of alcohol should be included in the latter genre is hugely significant for it precludes the possibility of change. For Ḥanafīs, the permissibility of alcohol was never merely a legal position -it was no less than a marker of Sunnī identity. Al-c aqā'id al-Nasafiyya, the most famous and widely taught Ḥanafī-Māturīdī credo, written by Najm al-Dīn al-Nasafī (d. 537/1142), contains the following declaration: "We approve the wiping on the two inner shoes (al-khuffayn) on a journey and at one's abode; we do not prohibit as unlawful the nabīdh of dates (al-tamr)" (Elder 1950: 155-6 ). 15 In the Badā'i c of al-Kāsānī, the doctrine on alcohol is articulated in starker terms, perhaps because of his location in Transoxiana, which tended towards a more purist form of Ḥanafīsm than one might meet in Baghdad, Delhi, or Istanbul: here, we are told that Abū Ḥanīfa's doctrine was that nabīdh al-khamr, literally, date wine, should not be prohibited, again because to do so would imply that the senior Companions of the Prophet who were known to have consumed it were sinners for doing so. Such high stakes; such powerful doctrinal statements. The doctrine constitutes a response to all prohibitionist jurists from among the Mālikīs, Shāfi c īs, Ḥanbalīs, and the Shī c a. But, it must surely have been directed more specifically at Shī c a opponents, who would require convincing not so much that the traditions in support of alcoholic beverages were authentic -about this the Shī c a were in little doubt -but rather that the Companions who were recorded in the annals of history as having consumed alcohol had religious justification for doing so. In this context, the Ḥanafī defence of alcoholic beverages constitutes a Sunnī defence of the Companions, as made plain by the famous quote of Abū Ḥanīfa reported in virtually every Ḥanafi legal text.
The basis for the doctrine of narrow prohibition in almost all places in Ḥanafī law where one meets the discussion of alcoholic beverages rests in stories of prominent Companions and indeed the Prophet himself. Non-scriptural rationalisations are seldom met with; an exception, however, is found in al-Mabsūṭ, penned by the last great mujtahid of Ḥanafī law, Al-Sarakhsī (d. 483/1090):
It was reported by Abū Mas c ūd al-Anṣārī, may God be pleased with him, that the Prophet, after requesting a drink on the day of sacrifice (yawm al-naḥr) in the year of the Farewell Pilgrimage (ḥajjat al-widā c ), was brought nabīdh from the wateringplace (siqāya). When he brought it close to his mouth it led him to scowl and he immediately sent it back. Al-c Abbās enquired as to whether it was ḥarām. The Prophet [letting actions speak] took it back, called for water, poured it over [the nabīdh] and then drank. He then said, "If your beverage becomes too overpowering then break its strength (fa-ksirū mutūnahā) with water." This was why he [initially] scowled and returned the drink; but then he feared that people would think that it is ḥarām and so he took it back and drank it. This indicates that there is nothing wrong (lā ba'sa) with drinking intensified muthallath. Let it not be claimed that [the Prophet] scowled because of its acidity; it would hardly be appropriate to give a thirsty pilgrim vinegar to drink. Thus we know that he scowled because of its intensity. There is a deeper symbolism here: khamr is promised to the believers in the Afterlife, as God says, "and rivers from khamr, delicious to its drinkers" (wa-anhārun min khamrin ladhatin lil-shāribīna) (Q.47:15) . It is necessary therefore that there exists in this world a permissible form (mubāḥ) of its kind which serves its function (ya c mal c amalahu) so that it might be known by direct effect (bi-l-iṣāba) just how delicious it will be. This will bring about excitement for it, since what is permissible in this world serves as a model for what has been promised in the abode of the Afterlife. Do you not see that when God promises the believers that they will drink from gold and silver goblets in the Afterlife that he allows them to experience something of its kind -drinking from goblets made of glass and crystal? To reinforce this point by way of another example: the sacred law (shar c ) has prohibited khamr without doubt as a test (ibtilā'); this purpose can only be realised after [one has] knowledge of how pleasurable [khamr is], so that withholding from it has its [desired] affect [. . .] the reality of that pleasure cannot become known by way of description (waṣf); it can only be known by way of tasting and direct effect. Therefore there must be a permissible drink of the same genus which allows the pleasure to be known by way of experience (tajriba). This is how the purpose behind prohibiting khamr can be realised. This is also the case for all prohibitions, like adultery and other things. It should be noted that khamr is prohibited in both small and large amounts because small amounts of it are never enough. As for these [other] beverages, they have a harshness (ghilẓ) and intensity (kathāfa) which means [drinking] small amounts do not lead to drinking large amounts. This is why small amounts of these are permissible, though they are described as intense, and it is [only] that amount which inebriates which is ḥarām. (Al-Sarakhsī 2000: 12: 4043) The passage is from one of the most authoritative works in Ḥanafī jurisprudence. In the so-called Post-Classical age of Ḥanafī law, al-Mabsūṭ remained hugely significant, as attested by the fifteenth-century Ḥanafī jurist, c Alā' al-Dīn 
Conclusion
That the normative Muslim position on alcohol is strict prohibition, in terms of consumption, production, handling, and sale, is today a truism. It came, therefore, as a considerable shock to vast numbers of viewers tuning in across the Middle East to the very popular Egyptian religious programme, La c allahum Yafqahoon, to hear Shaykh Khalid el-Gindi, al-Azhar-trained scholar and highly respected televangelist, proclaiming that only wine made of grapes and dates is prohibited in Islam and that drinking alcoholic beverages from other sources is permissible until the point of intoxication. 16 El-Gindi is not the first Al-Azhar scholar to take a discussion on alcohol in Islam to the media; in this article's introduction, Shaykh Sa c d al-Dīn al-Hilālī's intervention on the issue is referenced. In fact, El-Gindi, an ally of al-Hilālī, was wading into a debate initiated by his colleague as an act of solidarity. Why scholars like them are taking debates on highly stigmatised subjects usually the preserve of the Islamic seminaries (madrasas) to the public is not entirely clear and when probed about their own views, El-Gindi and al-Hilālī both maintained that their personal convictions remain in strict conformity with Muslim orthodoxy, that is, alcohol in all of its forms and variations is absolutely prohibited. Most likely, then, these acts of disclosure are meant to disrupt hegemonic discourses that posit Islam as having but one, unified position on alcohol.
In similar vein, this article serves as an intervention aiming to disrupt hegemonic discourses around what it means to be a Muslim. The claim "Muslims prohibit alcohol" has wide currency and is often taken to be the preeminent marker of Muslimness. The evidence adduced in this article, while taking the lead of illustrious al-Azhar scholars, enables a fuller deconstruction of such generalisations about what Muslims are supposed to think and be by demonstrating that the fiqh tradition -the ultimate manifestation of Islamicate science -simply does not provide unequivocal support for these assumptions.
In centring the Ḥanafī school of law, the dominant legal tradition in Islam in terms of its institutional longevity, demographic weight, and geographic extent, the argument resists attempts to dismiss it on the grounds that we are invoking a marginal interpretation which has no bearing on orthodox notions of what it means to be Muslim. Our critique of claims that Ḥanafī jurists performed a Shaybānic u-turn from the twelfth century onwards is a crucial part of the argument. While a de facto realignment of the school with the position of the other madhhabs does manifest itself via the formulation of a fatwa that appears in a number of authoritative jurisprudential works from al-Marghinānī onwards, we are the first to argue that this does not constitute an ideological shift; in fact the Ḥanafīs remain constant over time in advocating their unique position, continuing up until today to present comprehensive arguments against the prohibition of non-khamr alcoholic beverages. This is best exemplified in the writings of post-eighteenthcentury Indian Ḥanafī scholars. 17 For too long, what might be termed "normal science" in Islamic Studies has been content with exploring questions relating to Muslim belief and praxis as part of the fulfilment of one or another form of intellectual curiosity. This article marks a shift from this status quo by framing a question at the very heart of what it means to be Muslim in a completely new way. The rigour expected in Islamic Studies in terms of close textual excavation and carefully crafted translations are in every sense present here, but these are only the platform to a radically new form of investigation which disrupts the very direction of the conversation currently taking place on what constitutes Muslimness. This said, the purpose of this article is to define the history of a position, and it is not concerned with defining what is ultimately ḥalāl or ḥarām. This will always be the preserve of the Ummah at any one given point in time and place, and Allah knows best. (accessed 10 November 2017). 3. Throughout this article, "narrow prohibition," which has been adopted from Najam Haider (2013) , is used to describe the prohibition of khamr only to the exclusion of other alcoholic beverages. This usage is contrasted with "general prohibition," the position of all schools bar the Ḥanafīs, which considers all varieties of alcoholic beverage as prohibited (ḥarām). 4. A number of studies have in recent years taken up the issue of alcohol in Islam, especially, as discussed in Ḥanafī jurisprudence, but have done so to buttress over-arching theories of what constitutes Islam, Islamic law, Muslimness, and so, own rather than for any intrinsic value that a close reading of the alcohol question might generate. The late Shahab Ahmed (2016: 57-8) , whose knowledge of Islam, Islamicate languages, and range of scholarly interests is perhaps unrivalled in contemporary Islamic Studies, managed to miss the mark in his description of the juristic debate, incorrectly asserting that all schools of Islamic law prohibit alcohol in all its forms and appears to accept the view that alcohol prohibition is one of the distinctive marks of the Muslim world. Behnam Sadeghi (2013: 135-6 ) briefly discusses an assumed Ḥanafī reversal on alcoholic beverages to support his thesis on the provenance, nature, and historical development of Islamic law, suggesting that this was motivated by the need of the school to gain the acceptance of other Muslims. Najam Haider (2013: 85) argues, like Sadeghi, that the Ḥanafī School ultimately moved to prohibit all intoxicants in the sixth/twelfth century. He also puts forward an explanation for this supposed shift, which he roots in increasing pressure exerted on the Ḥanafīs by the Mālikīs and Shāfi c īs. He does not base his findings on a comprehensive survey of the Ḥanafī legal tradition, which explains sweeping generalisations and ultimately misrepresentation of Ḥanafī jurisprudence. 5. Why is khamr, especially as red wine, to be shunned by Muslims? We propose that the prohibition against wine (Q. 5.90) hinges on the role of wine in heathen/pagan worship, hence the juxtaposition of khamr with maysir (a game of chance), altars (anṣāb), and divining arrows (azlām). 6. Ibn Qutayba (d. 276/889) , Kufian jurist and ḥadīth scholar should also be listed among the Irāqians who took the view of narrow prohibition. While he was never the founder of a school, he is one of the preeminent authorities of early Islam. In his book on alcoholic beverages (Kitāb al-ashriba), he states clearly his preference for narrow prohibition. In the concluding section of his book, we read, That which inebriates in large quantities is disliked (makrūh) in small quantities; the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) warned against it as a disciplinary measure.
Therefore, it is laudable and rewardable if one avoids it; if however one drinks it, there is no blame on him, God willing! (Ibn Qutayba 1999: 128) 7. The reader will find the typology of alcoholic beverages in Ḥanafī jurisprudence in the Appendix a useful aid for understanding the many varieties of beverage which are mentioned in the texts that follow.
